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THE CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

THE FAMILY AUTOMOBILE
Liability of the Owner
By DONALD CAMPBELL

The family pictures and the family bible
have been in legal bibliography since the
time of Blackstone. The family automobile has appeared only recently but the
doctrine of liability attendant thereon has

caused a great deal of interest and confusion

among

laymen,

underwriters,

lawyers and courts.
Where the head of a family owns an
automobile which he keeps for the use and

pleasure of his family, he becomes a potential principal of any member of his
family who may drive it.
There is no dispute and no difficulty presented when the agency is established by

the ordinary and accepted use of the
phrase "an. agent on his principal's business." -,if the owner accompanies the
driver,,!or if the owner orders or requests a
member of his family to drive the car, or
if a member of the family is driving the
car upon some business of the owner, and
an accident occurs, because of negligent
operation, then the owner becomes liable.
The courts are not in accord in holding
the owner liable for negligent operation
where the owner's permission has ,been
given even for a particular occasion.
And where general permission only has
been given, and where occasional use has
been made with knowledge of the owner,
but without particular permission, and
where the owner has kept the car for the
use and pleasure of the family and has
never objected to its use for pleasure by
members of his family--and the mission
has been for the pleasure or on the individual bfisiness of the particular member
of the family who drove the automobile
or who rode in it-then we find the courts
-splitting into two definite groups.
'Hos v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1.
2Doran v. Thomes&, 76 N. 3. L. 754.
aVon Blaricom v. ,Dodgeon, 220 N. Y. 111.
'Parekcr v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361.
OMcFarlane v. Winters, 47 Utah 598.

One line of decisions holds the owner
of the family automobile not liable for its
negligent operation by a member of the
family, when that member of the family is
on his own business or driving for his
own pleasure and
"The fact that he, the son, had his
father's special or general permission to
use the ear is wholly immaterial."
Sic:
Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1.
Doras v. Thomsen, 76 N. 3. L. 754

A secbnd line of decisions holds a fathes
who has bought an automobile for the
pleasure of the family, has made it his
business to furnish entertainment for
members of his iamily, and
"A daughter driving for her own
pleasure (or on her own business), her
father's car, kept for the use of the
family, is his servant, for whose negligence in operating the car he is liable."
Sic:
Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486.
King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217.

Under the first line of decisions there is
no -reason to consider the litigation as involving "The Family Automobile" for
under those decisions the courts have consistently refuseid to consider an automobile
as a family automobile. They do not distinguish between an automobile and any
other movable property. They do not consider an automobile as an instrumentality
of dangerous potentialities and, of course,
they do not consider an automobile to be
dangerous per se. They insist that the
accepted theory of principal and agent, or
master and servant, be applied strictly to
each case whether an automobile, a horse
or a shotgun be involved. In short, they
do not recognize "The Family Automobile."
Gloehr v. Abell, 174 Mich. 590.
tBlair v. Broadwater, 121 Va. 301.
&lAnvillev. Ntissen, 162 N. C. 05.
"Missel v. Hayes, 86 N. J. L. 348.
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At the present writing-the states of Mis-

souri1 , New Jersey', New York', Alabama',

Utah', Michigan', Virginia' and North
Carolinas have decided according to the

strict rule.

However, New Jersey', New

York and North Carolina have rendered
decisions both ways.
The "equitable" doctrine has been upheld
Minnesota',
Oklahoma,
by Kentucky',
Washington',
Georgia',
Massachusetts",
Tennessee', Iowa and New Mexico' and by
Illinois' °
In the states where the strict doctrine
has been adhered to, however, the courts
have been quick to seize upon slight evidence which would fasten liability upon a
"responsible" meaning solvent defendant:
i.e., the owner of the family car.
In a New Jersey case", where a daughter
was driving the car and was the only member of the family in it, the court found
the-owner not liable-but in a later case",
because there were several other members
of the family in the car, which was driven
by the son, it was held that the father was
liable. In the latter case the court seemed
to feel that taking several members 'of the
family out for a ride was the father's business-but in the former case, the daughter
being alone, was on 'her own business.
In the first case before the Illinois Supreme Court", Justice Dunn in delivering
the opinion adopted by the majority after
commenting upon the equitable reasons assigned for holding an owner of the family
automobile liable in cases from other states,
disposes of the theroies advanced there by
this laconic statement"The argument may be sound enough,
but it has no application to the doctrine
of Master and Servant."
In an opinion rendered two years and six
months later," our Supreme Court seized
upon the fact that the minor daughter driving the family automobile was on her way
to pick up a pair of shoes at the cobblers.
'Stowt v. Morris, 147 Ky. 386.
sUpphoff v. McOormiok, 139 Minn. 132.
'McNeit v. McKoa, 33 Okla. 449.
*Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486.
'Grffin V. Russell, 144 Ga. 275,
Jordan v. Smith, 211 Mass. 269.
'King f. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217.
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As it was her father's business to furnish
her with shoes or other necessaries, the
court then said in short that the daughter
was the agent of her father in the performance of the business she was on.
Therefore, the father was liable.
The decisions have been -based upon such
matters as the age of the driver, whether
the driver was dependent on the owner
for support; whether the permission to
drive was special or general and whether
the purpose of the drive was for a family
errand, family pleasure or for the sole
pleasure of the driver.
From a perusal of the various cases, it
would seem that two essentials must exist
before the doctrine of the family automobile can be applied:
FIRST, an automobile maintained by the
father for the use and pleasure of the
family.
SECOND, a permission express or impliec
to the members of the family to use the
car.
It is not contended by the writer that
even though these essentials exist that the
courts adopting the strict application of the
rule of agency 'will now find the owner
liable, 'but it is believed that the courts
adopting the equitable rule will then so determine where these two essentials are
shown to exist. Since we are concerned
here primarily with the adoption of the
doctrine of the family automobile, we will
dismiss the contrary view with a quotation
from Van Blairicom v. Dodgson, 222 New
York Court of Appeals, 111:
"If the owner of a car ought to be responsible for the carelessness of everyone whom he permits to use it in the
latter's own business--that liability ought
to be sought by legislation rather than
by some new and anomalous slant applied
by the courts to the principals of agency."

That statement in brief is the attitude of
the courts of those states adopting the strict
rule.
8Crawford v. McElhinney, 171 Iowa 606.
"Gates v. Mader, 316 Ill. 313.
"Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 754.
"Missel v. Hayes, 86 N. J. L. 348.
"Arkin V. Page, 287 Ill. 420, at 430.
"Graham v. Page, 300 Ill. 40,
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We may now turn to a discustion of the
chronological holdings of- the Supreme
Courts of Illinois.
In the case of Arkin v. Page (opinion
filed April 15, 1919), 287 Ill. 420, a father
had provided an automobile which by the
evidence was for the use and- pleasure of
his family. It appeared in .thakt case that
the car was used at times by the son,
with his father's permission, or at least,
without objection -by his father, which is
merely another way of saying that the son,
had implied permission from his father to
use the car. The son wat driving the
automobile alone,on his way ,to a private
school where he. expected to, register and
pay for the tuition out of money of his
own, which he had in the bank. His father
did not know' where he 'was going, nor did
he know that he had the automobile on
this particular occasion. The son injured
the plaintiff in this case by negligent driving, and the lower court found the son to
be the agent of the father. The judgment
was sustained by the Appellate Court, but
reversed by the Supreme Court, although
with three judges dissenting. The majority
opinion held that at the time and place of
the happening of the accident, there was
no agency shown which could in any way
fasten liability upon the father. The court
quoted, elaborately from cases holding contrariwise under the loctrine of the family
automobile, and after stating that an automobile was not dangerous pei se, insisted
that the ordinary rules of agency should be
applied to this case. The arguments of
counsel with respect to the practical administration of justice and the necessity
of finding a -responsible defendant, rather
than a defendant against whom a judgment would -be a mere form, were said by
the court to be, perhaps, sound enough, but
not based upon law.
Illinois thereupon became a state in
which this strict rule had apparently been
adopted.
Nevertheless, three justices wrote a dissenting opinion in the' same case wherein
they insisted that if a parent has provided

an automobile for the -family use, he has
then made it his business, and any member
of the family driving the car with permission must be considered to be upon
the owner's business. In other words, the
minority decision insisted that pleasure
driving by members of the family or driving
on missions of their own with permission,
was as much a part of the owner's business
as the furnishing of the necessaries of life in
the usually accepted sense. About two
years later, in the case of Graham v. Page',
a minor daughter residing with her father,
who had provided the family with an automobile was driving the car to the cobblers
to pick up a pair of shoes that she had left
there to be repaired, and on the way she
injured the plaintiff by her negligent driving.
The Appellate Court reversed the finding of
the trial court where a verdict had been entered in favor of the plaintiff, basing their
decision upon what they understood to have
been the law announced in Arkin v. Page,
by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and Justice Farmer who' had dis,
sented in the Arkin v. Page case, delivered
the opinion of the court in this latter case.
The Supreme Court seemed to base the finding of agency in this latter case upon the
fact that,
"In this case defendant's daughter was
not merely driving the car for pleasure,
but was using it on a family errand, one
of the purposes her father testified he
kept the car for and one of .the purposes
he testified his daughter was authorized
to drive it for. The daughter was only sixteen years old, was engaged in no business, earning no money, but lived with
her parents and was clothed by them.
It was the duty and business of her
father to provide her shoes and when
needed, to have them repaired.- Instead
of her father taking the shoey to the
shop for repair and getting them there
when that had been done, he permitted
his daughter to do it and authorized the
use of the car by her for that purpose.
She was performing the business and duty
of her father in the manner and with the
means authorized by him. She was, if
not the servant, at* least the agent of
her fatheg in the performance of the duty

or business."
1300 Ill. 40.
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Had the court stopped right there the
writer is of the opinion that the strict
rule as applied in Arkin v. Page, might be
said to have been adhered to in the case
of Graham v. Page, for certainly in the
latter case the court plainly pointed out the
distinguishing feature, i.e., that the daughter was upon her father's business. The
holding in.Graham v. Page could then be
considered to be consistent with the holding in Arkin v. Page, although it would
seem that the age of the daughter and the
nature of her' errand were necessary -facts
in order to make her errand her father's
business. Fortunately or unfortunately, as
the case may be, the court did not stop with
that distinction, but continued with a discussion of the general principle involved
in determining the agency, to wit:
"The weight of authority supports the
liability of the owner of a car, which is
kept for family use and pleasure where
an injury is negligently caused by it
while driven by one of his children by
his permission, and the reasoning of
those cases seem sound and more in
harmony with the principles of Justice.
We agree with the Supreme Court of
Tennessee that, where a father provides
his family with an automobile for their
pleasure,
comfort
and entertainment,
'the dictates of natural justice should require that the owner should be responsible for its negligent operation, because
only by doing so, as a general rule, can
sustantial justice be attained. King v.
.mythe, 140 Tenn. 217'."
The above discussion and statement of

the owner of a car which is kept 'for family
use and pleasure, etc. Meanwhile, on February 17, 1925, in the case of Gates v.
Mader", the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed,
if not advanced, the doctrine of the family
automobile given out in the case of Graham
v. Page, but-it is interesting to note that
three judges in this last case dissented from
the.holding of the majority opinion which
is written by Justice Farmer, one of the
dissenters in the first case of Arkin v.
Page.
In this last case, a son independent and
not living at home, at the request of his
mother, drove the automobile of the father,
containing his mother and her friends, for
the pleasure and convenience of the mother.
The son had his -father's knowledge and
general permission to drive the car. The
,Supreme Court found that the son was the
agent of the father and in the opinion,
practically admitted that they had receded
.from the attitude held at the time the
Arkin v. Page case was decided.
"We said in ihat case (Graham v.
Page) that the weight of authority supported the liability of the owner of a
car kept for family use and pleasure
when an injury was negligently caused
by it while driven by one of his children
* * *. In

our opinion, liability in this

case is based on reason and justice. Defendant denied he knew that the car
was going to be used on a particular
occasion, but admits its use was -authorized by him. This case is not controlled by the Arkin case."

the court, whether it may be considered
dicta or part of the opinion, certainly
changes the line up of the State of Illinois.
It appears to the writer that the Supreme
Court of Illinois thereby committed itself
to the equitable doctrine.
Following that decision by the Supreme
Court, the Appellate Court of the First
District, in the case of Cloyes v, Plattje1 ,
discussed and reiterated the holding of the
Supreme Court, and again referred.to the
leading case of King v. Smythe, quoting
from that case and stating that the weight
of authority now supports the liability of

The court then again refers to King v.
Smythe1 , as well as a number of other
cases, in all of which cases the doctrine'
of the family automobile has been adopted.
In January 1926 the Appellate Court for
the First District had to again consider a
case*, wherein a daughter who was single,
living at home and had her father's general permission to use his automobile, was
out driving with her fiance and her sister.
The father had no knowledge of the particular trip and the defendant contended
in this case that it fell outside of the case
of Gates v. Mader -for the reason that in

2231 I1. App. 183.
Tenn. 217.
1316 Ill. 313.

1140 Tenn. 217.
'See classified cases supra.
'Beesley v. Goldstein, 239 I1. App. 231.

2140
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Gates v. Mader, the automobile was being
used -for the purpose for which it was
bought and that in 'this case the purpose
was foreign to that for which the defendant maintained it. In other words, that
the daughter was not driving it for the
pleasure of the family, but on a mission
of her own. The court, however, found itself unable to appreciate the distinction
sought to be made and stated that the
driving of her fiance and sister about the
city was well within the purpose mentioned,
i.e., the use and pleasure of the family.
While it is not possible to foretell what
opinion might be rendered by the Supreme
Court of Illinois in a similax case, where
it might- be possible to point out a distinction in facts, yet it would seem that Illinois has definitely and consciously adopted
the doctrine of the family automobile.
The various courts in arriving at their
decisions to hold the owner of the family
automobile liable, have stated in different
ways that liability does not rest upon a
relationship of parent and child nor -upon
the solvency of the defendant. It would
seem, however, thai they have broadened
the scope of the principal's business and,
perhaps, extended the relation of principal
and- agent more than they might have done
had the automobile not come into such
common use. The word permission has
been freighted with liability. From the
following excerpts taken from various
cases, the reader might come to the conclusion that the doctrine of the family automobile has been adopted in the interests of
justice and equity, rather than strict application of law.
King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217.
"If an instrumentality (automobible)
of this kind is placed in the hands of
his family by a father for the family's

pleasure, comfort and entertainment, the
dictates of natural Justice should require
that the owner should be responsible for
its negligent operation, because, only by
doing so, as a general rule can substantial Justice be attained."
"We think the practical administraton
of Justice between the parties is more
the duty of .the court than the preservation of some esoteric theory concerning
the law of principal and agent."

Birch v. Abercrombie; 74 Wash. 486.
"Any other view would set a premium
upon the failure of the owner to employ a competent chauffeur."
"The adoption of a doctrine so callously technical would be little short of
calamitous."
Arkin v. Page, 287 11. 420 (dissening
opinion).
"The owner must anticipate that negligence in operating may produce the most
serious consequences."
Gates v. Mader, 316 Ill. 313.
"In our, opinion liability in this case
is based on reason and Justice."
Missell _v. Hayes, 86 N. J. L. 348 (usually contra) where court seized upon the
fact that son was drivisig mother and sister:
"It is withi the scope of.the father's
business to furnish his-wife and daughter
with outdoor recreation, just the same
as it is his business to furnish them with
food and clothing * * *."

The courts that refuse to adopt these
equitable and modifying. rules to the strict
rules of agency say that here is a fine
example of legislation by the courts.
The adherents of the famnily automobile
doctrine respond to the effect that courts
may apply the old rules of agency to new
conditions and still function properly and
justly.
Popular sentiment or legislation
will probably bear them out.
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